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Cumulative cultural evolution is the term given to a particular kind of social learning, 
which allows for the accumulation of modifications over time, involving a ratchet-like 
effect where successful modifications are maintained until they can be improved upon. 
There has been great interest in the topic of cumulative cultural evolution from 
researchers from a wide variety of disciplines, but until recently there were no 
experimental studies of this phenomenon. Here we describe our motivations for 
developing experimental methods for studying cumulative cultural evolution, and review 
results we have obtained using these techniques. The results that we describe have 
provided insights into understanding the outcomes of cultural processes at the population 
level. Our experiments show that cumulative cultural evolution can result in adaptive 
complexity in behaviour, and also can also produce convergence in behaviour. These 
findings lend support to ideas that some behaviours commonly attributed to natural 
selection and innate tendencies could in fact be shaped by cultural processes.  
 
 
1. Background 
 
In this review, we aim to explain why there is currently a need for an 
experimental science of cumulative cultural evolution. We will discuss methods 
that we have developed which we believe can be employed in order to test 
experimental hypotheses about cumulative cultural evolution. We will also 
discuss results that we have obtained using these methods, and the implications 
that these findings have for our understanding of the effects of cumulative cultural 
evolution on human behaviour. 
 
1.1. What is cumulative cultural evolution? 
In order to explain the motivation behind our research on cumulative 
cultural evolution, we begin by explaining why it is an interesting behavioural 
phenomenon and an important topic of study. Cumulative cultural evolution is 
distinct from culture in the general sense in a number of ways. Whilst culture is 
accepted by most to refer to a socially transmitted heritage peculiar to a particular 
society (Boyd & Richerson 1985)1, the definition of cumulative cultural evolution 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that there are many different definitions of culture in the literature. Kroeber 
and Kluckhohn (1952) identified multiple different definitions from authors from a variety of 
disciplines. Boyd and Richerson (1985) point out that, within Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s 
definitions, there is broad agreement on the notion of culture as socially transmitted heritage 
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is considerably narrower. Boyd and Richerson (1994) showed that social learning 
could increase the average fitness of a population if it permitted “learned 
improvements to accumulate from one generation to the next” (p134), essentially 
describing what they later termed cumulative cultural evolution (Boyd & 
Richerson 1996). Tomasello (1990; 1999; Tomasello et al. 1993) has coined the 
term “the ratchet effect” to capture a similar notion: “The process of cumulative 
cultural evolution requires not only creative invention but also, and just as 
importantly, faithful social transmission that can work as a ratchet to prevent 
slippage backward – so that the newly invented artifact or practice preserves its 
new and improved form at least somewhat faithfully until a further modification 
or improvement comes along.” (Tomasello, 1999, p5). Hence, cumulative cultural 
evolution refers to situations in which social transmission allows for successive 
improvements to performance over generations of learners, generated by the 
accumulation of modifications to the transmitted behaviours. 
Cumulative cultural evolution in this sense should be distinguished from 
cultural evolution which does not lead to appreciable improvement in efficiency 
of the behaviours in question. Mesoudi et al. (2004) have argued that all of human 
culture constitutes an evolutionary process, since it involves variation (multiple 
traits that may be copied), heritability (similarity between traits as a result of 
copying), and competition (some traits are copied more than others), leading to 
the accumulation of modifications over time. However, not all such examples 
involve increasing efficiency or complexity. They therefore do not constitute the 
kind of learning that Richerson and Boyd (1994) or Tomasello (1999) were 
referring to, whereby each generation is provided with shortcuts to the end results 
of extensive trial and error learning amassed by their cultural ancestors. So, 
although methods developed in evolutionary biology are currently proving 
extremely useful in reconstructing the history of cultural products, such as textile 
designs (Tehrani and Collard 2002), linguistic forms (Gray and Jordan 2000), and 
stories (Barbrook et al. 1998), these examples do not represent the kind of process 
that we are referring to as cumulative cultural evolution. 
All the same, even in these narrow terms, cumulative cultural evolution 
seems to pervade human society. Each generation builds on the knowledge, 
inventions and achievements of the previous one. Our present-day technologies 
exist only as a result of our ability to understand and make use of the imparted 
knowledge and artefacts of others. In contrast, the phenomenon of cumulative 
cultural evolution seems to be intriguingly rare in nonhumans. This is despite the 
fact that there are plenty of cases of animal culture in the more general sense. To 
take just one well-known example, the sweet potato washing behaviour of the 
Japanese macaques of Koshima (e.g. Kawai 1965; Kawamura 1959), appears to 
have been acquired through social learning, since the behaviour spread initially to 
the close associates of the first monkey to use this technique, and then on to those 
individuals’ associates. However, as a number of researchers have pointed out 
(most notably Boyd & Richerson 1996), examples of animal social learning such 
as this typically involve relatively simple behaviours that could also be readily 
                                                                                                                                     
peculiar to a particular society, which is why we selected this description. Our criteria for culture 
in the general sense are therefore intentionally broad and inclusive.  
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learned through individual trial and error processes. There is little evidence of 
successive improvement over generations, or of the accumulation of 
modifications, and therefore no suggestion that the behaviours concerned could 
not have been invented by a single individual.  
 
1.2. Debates in cumulative cultural evolution 
A strong motivation for us in developing experimental methods for 
studying cumulative cultural evolution was the fact that there are a number of 
important unresolved issues surrounding this topic which have been the focus of 
much debate. The issue of whether cumulative cultural evolution is unique to 
humans, or merely relatively rare in nonhumans, is just one of these. In addition, 
there is still disagreement over the learning mechanisms upon which cumulative 
cultural evolution may depend, and also the extent to which it is responsible for 
complex adaptive human behaviours. The details of these debates are summarised 
below. 
1.2.1. Human uniqueness. The question that has probably drawn the most 
attention surrounding cumulative cultural evolution is that of whether the 
phenomenon is unique to humans. As noted above, Boyd and Richerson (1996), 
amongst others, have drawn attention to the fact that although social learning is 
relatively common in the animal kingdom, cumulative cultural evolution appears 
to be extremely rare: “cumulative cultural evolution resulting in behaviors that no 
individual could invent on their own is limited to humans, song birds, and perhaps 
chimpanzees” (Boyd & Richerson 1996, p77). Likewise, Heyes (1993) has drawn 
a distinction between the sorts of behaviours that nonhumans appear to learn 
socially, in comparison with those of humans: “the human attributes that are 
described as ‘cultural’ in ordinary discourse, seem to be a good deal more 
complex than, for example, potato washing and termite-fishing…and it is 
plausible that their greater complexity derives from the accumulation of 
modifications” (Heyes 1993, p1004). 
Even stronger statements have been made by others. For example, Galef 
(1992) has stated that “human culture accumulates over generations and can lead 
to invention and transmission of increasingly complex behaviours. No one has 
claimed that any animal learns any behaviour from conspecifics that it could not 
learn independently through interaction with its physical environment” (Galef 
1992, p161). Along similar lines, Tomasello (1999) has asserted that “the cultural 
traditions and artifacts of human beings accumulate modifications over time in a 
way that those of other animal species do not” (Tomasello 1999, p5).  
Of course, these authors are not claiming that social learning does not help 
animals to acquire useful behaviours. The example of the Koshima macaques 
illustrates how an advantageous invention can readily spread through a group. The 
issue is again the notion of the cultural ratchet, and of later generations exploiting 
the labours of previous ones in a way that allows them to make use of behaviours 
that they could not have learned by themselves.  
All the same, some researchers have argued that there is in fact compelling 
evidence for cumulative cultural evolution in nonhumans. For example, Boesch 
(2003) cites three examples of chimpanzee behaviours which he suggests may 
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have arisen through accumulated modifications of socially learned behaviour. One 
of these is nut cracking behaviour, which is observed in West African chimpanzee 
populations (Whiten et al. 1999). While some chimpanzees use fixed anvils, such 
as tree roots, others use loose stones. Furthermore, Sugiyama (1997) reported that 
some chimpanzees at the Bossou field site sometimes used an extra stone to 
stabilise the stone anvils upon which the nut is placed for cracking, perhaps 
indicating a refinement on the simpler technique. 
Whiten et al. (2003) have put forward similar examples of possible 
cumulative culture in chimpanzees, including the nut cracking behaviour just 
mentioned. They also suggested that the alternative tool-use techniques used to 
forage on ants could show evidence of ratcheting. Of the two methods used, one is 
more elaborate, involving bimanual coordination, and also results in a greater 
yield (Humle & Matsuzawa 2002) and therefore Whiten et al. (2003) suggested 
that this could represent an elaboration on the simpler version. 
Cumulative culture has also been proposed in species other than 
chimpanzees. Hunt and Gray (2003) proposed that the tool manufacture skills 
observed in New Caledonian crows had been acquired through cumulative 
cultural evolution. They were able to document population specific methods of 
tool manufacture, which were apparently unrelated to local ecological conditions, 
and these different methods showed varying degrees of complexity. They 
therefore argued that these different techniques had been developed through 
cumulative cultural evolution. However, it is still unclear whether these 
techniques are socially learned at all, as it seems that tool manufacture abilities 
may be largely under genetic control in this species (Kenward et al. 2005). 
There is clearly good reason to remain open-minded with regard to the 
question of whether cumulative cultural evolution is unique to humans. Boesch 
and Tomasello (1998), for example, have made the point that we have very little 
data on the behaviour of previous generations of chimpanzees, since long-term 
studies of their behaviour only began around forty years ago. This inevitably 
makes it difficult to judge whether their behaviour has shown any ratcheting over 
time.  
1.2.2. The cognitive underpinnings of cumulative cultural evolution. 
Related to the above debate, researchers have also deliberated over the issue of 
the cognitive mechanisms that may or may not be necessary for cumulative 
culture. This is necessarily tied in with the issue of which species exhibit this 
phenomenon, since beliefs about which cognitive processes may be involved have 
typically lay behind opinions about which species possess the capacity.  
For example, Boyd and Richerson (1996) have made a compelling 
argument that a capacity for “true imitation” is necessary for cumulative cultural 
evolution. By true imitation they refer to any form of learning in which 
individuals can learn a new behaviour by perceiving another individual’s 
performance of that behaviour. Boyd and Richerson (1996) also use the term 
“observational learning”, which may be slightly misleading in this context as 
visual perception is not necessarily involved, since their definition encompasses 
learning about vocal communication, such as the learning of grammatical rules 
(Richerson & Boyd 2005) and bird song learning. In any case, other types of 
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social learning which they specify cannot support cumulative cultural evolution 
are those in which the behaviour itself is not what is learned from another 
individual. Similar behaviours may arise between two individuals because the 
actions of one individual function to draw the attention of another to a particular 
location (“local enhancement”) or class of objects (“stimulus enhancement”) 
(Whiten & Ham 1992). However, in such cases, the behaviour is learned by trial 
and error, and the presence of the other individual has simply made that learning 
more likely. 
Boyd and Richerson (1996) argue that, since cumulative cultural evolution 
by definition must allow learners to proceed from a more advanced starting point 
than was possible for previous generations, true imitation is a necessary condition 
for its occurrence. Learning which relies upon trial and error processes will 
inevitably mean that each new learner has to start from scratch, thereby wiping 
out any useful innovations which may have been chanced upon by others. 
Tomasello (e.g. Tomasello et al. 1993; Tomasello 1999) has made a 
similar argument, proposing that imitation and teaching, each dependent on a 
capacity for taking the perspective of another, are the foundations of cumulative 
cultural evolution. Like Boyd and Richerson, Tomasello has stressed the 
importance of faithful transmission (and therefore imitation) but has also 
emphasised the need for an understanding of the goals of other individuals. 
Understanding what cultural practices are about, such as what a tool is used for, 
or what a particular communicative signal means, is crucial to human cultural 
learning (Tomasello 1999), so he has suggested this to be another necessary 
feature of cumulative cultural evolution (see also Hermann et al. 2007, for a 
recent conceptualisation of this view). 
However, not all theorists see things in this way. Heyes (1993), for 
example, has stated that there is no reason why imitation should be particularly 
crucial to the generation of cumulative behavioural change. Heyes (1993) 
proposed that the particular learning mechanism involved is in fact irrelevant to 
the issue of faithful transmission, and that what really matters is whether or not a 
behaviour will extinguish once learned. Heyes (1993) cited Galef et al.’s (1986) 
data from a two-action study on budgerigars: subjects that observed conspecifics 
accessing hidden food using either their beak or their foot tended to match the 
demonstrated technique for only the first two trials post-demonstration. In later 
trials, the difference between the groups disappeared. Therefore she has argued 
that behaviours learned via imitation, like any other, will be subject to 
modification from trial and error learning. Heyes (1993) proposed that in fact 
cumulative culture would be more likely to be supported by a separate insulating 
mechanism which protects socially learned information against the influence of 
trial and error learning.  
Laland and Hoppitt (2003), similarly, have argued that there is currently 
no reason to believe that either imitation or teaching are particularly significant to 
cumulative cultural evolution. Laland (2004) has instead suggested that an ability 
to evaluate the relative effectiveness of behavioural alternatives would be a more 
plausible cognitive precursor to cumulative culture. Along similar lines, Enquist 
and Ghirlanda (2007) have argued for the importance of an “adaptive filtering” 
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mechanism. Modelling populations of social learners, Enquist and Ghirlanda 
(2007) concluded that, without such a filter, cumulative culture would result in the 
acquisition of many maladaptive traits and therefore could not evolve. However, a 
capacity to filter out maladaptive traits causes adaptive traits to accumulate 
preferentially, generating the ratchet effect which is characteristic of human 
culture.  
In conclusion therefore, there are a range of different views regarding the 
cognitive abilities upon which cumulative cultural evolution may depend. 
However, experimental work on this topic could contribute greatly to addressing 
this question, as we hope to elucidate later, and such work will also have 
implications for questions about human uniqueness.  
 
1.2.3. The origins of complex human behaviour 
Just as there is disagreement over the precursors to cumulative cultural 
evolution, as detailed above, there are also conflicting views on the outcomes of 
this process, which we will outline here. There is broad agreement that cumulative 
cultural evolution is responsible for a number of particularly interesting human 
traits. Indeed, this goes some way to explaining why so many researchers have 
been fascinated by this phenomenon. Tomasello (e.g. 1999) has argued that, given 
that our species shared a common ancestor with chimpanzees a mere six million 
years ago, the cognitive achievements of modern humans (such as written 
language, mathematics, and complex technologies) have developed implausibly 
rapidly to be attributed to natural selection on behaviour. Instead he has proposed 
that cumulative cultural evolution may have played a significant role, and that this 
would have allowed for much more rapid behavioural change than would genetic 
evolution. Boyd and Richerson (1996) have emphasised the influence of 
cumulative cultural evolution in terms of the success of humans as a species. Our 
ability to exploit a range of habitats has allowed us to become the most 
widespread animal on the planet. 
However, recently arguments have been put forward which propose a role 
for cumulative cultural evolution in the origins of behaviours which have been 
popularly believed to be largely dependent on naturally selected innate 
tendencies. For example, the structural properties shared by many different 
languages (usually referred to as linguistic universals) have been often been 
argued to be good evidence of innate language-specific capabilities, common to 
all humans (e.g. Pinker & Bloom 1990). However, this view has recently been 
challenged by Christiansen and Chater (in press) and Kirby et al. (2007), amongst 
others (see also Smith and Kirby this issue).  
Kirby et al. (2007) have argued that even extremely weak biases in 
learning (such as an expectation of regularity) can, over generations of learners, 
result in languages which are strongly adapted to those biases. The result of this is 
that no language-specific capacity is necessary in order to explain the existence of 
linguistic universals, as universals could arise from slight biases in general 
purpose learning mechanisms. Within this view, languages are therefore seen as 
shaped by the brain (Christiansen & Chater in press) through the repeated cycle of 
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learning and use over many generations, rather than the brain being adapted to 
language.  
The crucial question here really is whether cumulative cultural evolution, 
driven by general learning mechanisms, can account for cross-cultural universals 
in behaviour. Universality in complex adaptive human behaviour is often taken as 
a hallmark of highly specialised innate predispositions (e.g. Buss 1991; Pinker & 
Bloom 1990). However, since cumulative cultural evolution can similarly result in 
complex adaptive behaviour, the issue is really whether it also results in 
convergence in behaviour, such that separate populations independently invent 
and retain similar behaviours. Whilst culture is generally viewed as a source of 
behavioural variation between cultures, under certain circumstances it may result 
in cross-cultural convergence. We explain in section 5 how our experimental 
work has so far contributed to this question. 
Clearly therefore, there are currently some extremely interesting 
intellectual disputes within the field of cumulative cultural evolution, each of 
which could benefit from empirical studies of this phenomenon. In the next 
section we will examine existing approaches to studying cumulative cultural 
evolution, and what these studies have so far been able to contribute. 
 
 
2. Approaches to studying cumulative cultural evolution 
 
2.1. Studying cumulative cultural evolution in the field 
In order to study the phenomenon of cumulative cultural evolution in 
natural populations, it is necessary to have access to fairly accurate information 
about the past forms of behaviours. This can be difficult as many behaviours leave 
no discernable trace. However, it is possible to study cumulative cultural 
evolution from cultural artefacts, including archaeological finds. For example, we 
can infer from the archaeological record (or rather, the lack of it) that any tools 
used by hominids up until about two million years ago, were probably comparable 
to those used by other great apes, such as chimpanzees (Ambrose 2001). We also 
know that, around a quarter of a million years ago, tools manufactured by humans 
began to show rapid change and development. Around this time, a wide variety of 
different stone tools were being used by humans, each tailored to a specific 
function.  
Some authors have documented progress in science and technology in 
explicitly evolutionary terms (e.g. Basalla’s 1988 The Evolution of Technology, 
and Wilder’s 1968 Evolution of Mathematical Concepts). In other texts the notion 
of accumulation is more implicit. Inventions and discoveries are dated, and 
advancement is assumed (e.g. Bunch & Hellemans 2004). However, irrespective 
of the source consulted, evidence can readily be found for ratcheting, with new 
developments building on previous ones. Loss of information or skills from a 
population is very much the exception, rather than the rule (although it is worth 
noting that such loss certainly has been documented; the decline in complexity of 
the Tasmanian toolkit is probably the best known example, e.g. Henrich 2004). 
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Consider two examples, the wheel and mathematical notation. The 
invention of the wheel as an aid to transportation is generally dated between five 
and six thousand years ago, with early wheels constituting simple wooden disks 
with a hole for the axle. The spoked wheel was only invented more recently 
(around four thousand years ago). The invention of the wheel then gave rise to a 
number of other technological innovations including cogs and pulleys (Basalla 
1988; Bunch & Hellemans 2004). Mathematical systems of notation have also 
developed considerably over time, with simple tally systems recorded from 
around thirty thousand years ago. However, more abstract symbolic 
representations are much more recent. Place value notation was being used by the 
Mesopotamians by around four thousands years ago, but also seems to have been 
independently invented by the Indians within the last two thousand years, leading 
to our current “Arabic” notation. The invention of a symbol to represent zero 
(which made the place notation system considerably more informative) was more 
recent still, in both cultures (Wilder 1968; Bunch & Hellemans 2004). 
Clearly, valuable information can be gleaned from studying cumulative 
cultural evolution in natural populations. Important insights can be gained into the 
kinds of behaviours which show cumulative cultural evolution over time, and the 
nature of the changes that occur. These can, up to a point, address certain issues 
raised in the previous section. For example, adequate information on the past 
forms of behaviour in populations which have had little contact with one another 
could enhance our understanding of convergence in cumulative cultural evolution, 
and therefore extent to which it may explain cross-cultural universals. However, 
there are limitations to the kinds of questions one can ask when using these kinds 
of data. Mesoudi (Mesoudi 2007; Mesoudi & O’Brien 2008) has argued that 
historical methods have several drawbacks when it comes to studying cultural 
variation, and the same apply for investigations of cumulative cultural evolution. 
The main weakness of this approach, certainly from the perspective of addressing 
some of the debates listed above, is that it does not allow for manipulation of 
variables of interest. We can ask questions about how cumulative cultural 
evolution has occurred, but we cannot ask what might have happened, had 
circumstances been slightly different. In contrast, using an experimental approach, 
we can explicitly manipulate factors believed to be crucial in generating 
cumulative cultural evolution, to test hypotheses about necessary precursors. 
Likewise we can set out to study the outcomes of cumulative cultural evolution in 
multiple replicated populations under controlled conditions.  
 
2.2. Theoretical studies of cumulative cultural evolution 
In contrast, theoretical studies of cumulative cultural evolution permit 
researchers to manipulate as many variables as they desire, and controlling 
extraneous factors is of course not an issue. There are many theoretical models 
involving social learning, but only a few have tested hypotheses relevant to the 
debates detailed above. For instance, Boyd and Richerson’s (1996) paper included 
a theoretical analysis of why cumulative cultural evolution seems to be a rare 
phenomenon within the animal kingdom. Their models showed that an ability to 
copy the behaviour of others only becomes more useful than a capacity for 
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individual learning when other members of the population are themselves 
engaging in behaviours with higher payoffs than would be achieved with 
individual learning alone. Hence there is a significant obstacle to the evolution of 
such capabilities since they are only valuable once they are widespread in the 
population. Enquist and Ghirlanda (2007) have addressed the issue of the 
cognitive abilities necessary for cumulative cultural evolution. As mentioned 
above, their models indicate that a mechanism which can selectively filter out 
maladaptive behaviours would be crucial for cumulative cultural evolution to 
evolve. Work by Kirby and colleagues (e.g. Kirby et al. 2007; Kirby & 
Christiansen 2003; Smith et al. 2003; Smith and Kirby this issue) has investigated 
the question of whether complex innate competencies are a necessary feature for 
the evolution of structured language. Modelling iterated learning of 
communication systems, they have shown that structural features, such as 
compositionality, can arise through cultural transmission over multiple 
generations. 
However, the great strength of theoretical models, in terms of the 
flexibility afforded, is also to an extent their weakness. The constraints imposed 
on the models are those selected by their creator, and the conclusions drawn 
necessarily depend on the underlying assumptions, which may or may not be 
accurate. In contrast, in experimental studies with human subjects, one can gain 
important insights into the likely results of real learning processes repeated over 
multiple generations. In the following sections we detail experimental approaches 
which can be used to study culture in the laboratory (Section 3), and explain how 
we have applied these methods to test hypotheses about cumulative cultural 
evolution (Section 4). 
 
 
3. Studying culture in the laboratory 
 
There are a variety of methods which have been used for studying culture 
under laboratory conditions (for reviews see: Mesoudi 2007; Mesoudi & Whiten 
this issue; Whiten & Mesoudi this issue). The aim of such approaches is 
essentially to simulate cultural phenomena on a small scale, allowing researchers 
to study how behaviours change over time as a result of repeated learning and 
transmission between individuals. Whilst experimental approaches inevitably 
have imperfections of their own, we consider that the power to manipulate 
variables, and collect precisely the data that is required, constrained and informed 
by the behaviour of real participants, strikes a very constructive balance. 
The utility of such methods is best illustrated with an example of this kind 
of study. Jacobs and Campbell (1961) used laboratory “microcultures” (Gerard, 
Kluckhohn & Rapoport 1956) aiming to “demonstrate a perpetuation of ‘cultural’ 
characteristics that transcends the replacement of individual persons” (p649). 
Their study therefore involved simulating generational succession through the 
repeated removal and replacement of participants within small groups. Jacobs and 
Campbell (1961) wanted to determine whether participants’ tendencies to 
conform to majority opinion could result in long-lasting traditions of 
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counterintuitive beliefs. Groups were founded by experimental confederates, 
instructed to respond with a significant overestimation of their true perception of 
the strength of a visual movement illusion, but these were gradually replaced by 
naïve participants. In an example of one of Jacobs and Campbell’s (1961) 
conditions, there were three individuals present in the test group at any one time, 
and at the start of the experiment two of these individuals were confederates and 
one was a naïve participant. Each individual from the group was asked to estimate 
the degree of the illusory movement perceived, starting with the confederates, and 
their responses were recorded. This was repeated thirty times, after which one of 
the confederates was removed and replaced by another naïve participant. Thirty 
more trials were then carried out with this new group, and the remaining 
confederate was then removed and replaced with a further naïve participant. This 
procedure continued for a total of ten “generations”. Jacobs and Campbell (1961) 
also ran further conditions, manipulating the size of the test group (varying 
between one individual and four), and the number of confederates in the first 
generation (varying between zero and three). Each experimental condition was 
replicated three times each. Jacobs and Campbell (1961) found that the 
overestimation bias induced by the confederates persisted for several generations 
after the final confederate had been removed. 
Similar methods, involving the removal and replacement of participants 
within groups, have since been adopted by Insko and colleagues (Insko et al. 
1980; 1983) and also more recently by Baum et al. (2004). The benefit of this 
method lies not only in the power to manipulate certain key variables (e.g. size of 
group and number of confederates for Jacobs and Campbell 1961), but also in the 
timescale required for the study. Whilst cultural evolution is generally assumed to 
occur on a timescale of multiple human lifespans, these experiments seek to study 
cultural phenomena over learner generations, rather than reproductive 
generations. For this reason such methods have also been applied within the 
literature on animal social learning (e.g. Galef & Allen 1995; Laland & Williams 
1997; 1998). 
As well as methods involving removal and replacement of participants in 
groups, there are also other methods which can be used to study culture under 
experimental conditions (for a comprehensive reviews see Mesoudi 2007; 
Mesoudi & Whiten this issue; Whiten & Mesoudi this issue), but these are less 
relevant in terms of finding an experimental model for studying cumulative 
cultural evolution. For example Bartlett (1932) made use of the “method of serial 
reproduction” in his studies of human memory, a method which has been recently 
revived by Mesoudi and colleagues (Mesoudi & Whiten 2004; Mesoudi et al. 
2006). Although chains of multiple generations are involved, with new 
participants learning from previous learners, it is quite different from the method 
detailed above in a number of important respects. In this type of research, 
participants are explicitly instructed to copy, in that their aim is to reproduce 
information as accurately as they possibly can. The focus is therefore on the 
degradation of the information originally provided to the first participant. Whilst 
this is an excellent method for revealing people’s unconscious cognitive biases (as 
it allows researchers to investigate what sort of information is omitted, or 
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introduced, when participants are actively trying to reproduce material as 
accurately as possible), it is clearly considerably less appropriate for studying 
cumulative cultural evolution. Any laboratory model of cumulative cultural 
evolution must involve behaviours which can show measurable improvement over 
generations, and it is also important that participants understand that the choice of 
whether or not to copy is their own. 
Until recently, even the experimental work which has been carried out 
using the replacement method has fallen short of providing an adequate model of 
cumulative cultural evolution. As noted above, the behaviours to be transmitted 
must be capable of showing measurable improvement over generations, as a 
consequence of accumulated modifications. The perceptual judgement task used 
by Jacobs and Campbell (1961) is therefore far too simple a behaviour. Work 
carried out by Baum et al. (2004) (as well as other work from the same group, e.g. 
McElreath et al., 2005; Efferson et al., 2007; Efferson et al., 2008; McElreath et 
al. this volume) does show increasingly adaptive choices made by participants 
over generations, but these experiments involve participants choosing between 
two options each of which has an unpredictable payoff. This method has been 
used to elucidate participants’ strategies in gauging their use of socially- and 
individually-acquired information in order to make best guess choices. In terms of 
studying cumulative cultural evolution however, the method is less appropriate. 
Whilst the average payoffs seem to increase over time, as a result of participants 
gravitating towards the choice which is the best on average, the behaviours 
themselves (of one choice over another) are not ideal candidates in terms of 
demonstrating the accumulation of modifications.  
Interestingly, in Insko’s studies (Insko et al. 1980; 1983), which involved 
between-group trading of paper origami products manufactured by group 
members, groups made increasingly greater profits over generations, suggesting 
more efficient methods of production were being passed on. However, it is 
unclear what the nature of the improved efficiency was, and whether this was 
definitely attributable to transmission between generations. In the following 
section we detail the method that we have developed for studying cumulative 
cultural evolution experimentally. Within this issue, studies reported by Fay et al. 
and Flynn show similar effects to ours which may also provide promising 
approaches for studying cumulative cultural evolution. 
 
 
4. A method for studying cumulative cultural evolution in the laboratory 
 
4.1. The tasks 
As explained above, the task presented to participants must be chosen very 
carefully in order to create an effective laboratory model of cumulative cultural 
evolution. It was important that we chose a task that could show measurable 
improvements in performance over generations, based on the accumulation of 
modifications. A task with a clear aim and an objective measure of success was 
therefore crucial, as we needed to be able to show that participants’ scores were, 
on average, better the further they were down the chain (therefore showing that 
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the skills and knowledge had accumulated over the learner generations). It was 
also important for our design to choose tasks which were simple and easy enough 
for participants to complete in a short space of time, in order to make these 
feasible laboratory methods. However, the tasks also needed to be sufficiently 
difficult and complex that definite benefits could be obtained from opportunities 
for social learning, and that the accumulation of modifications could be 
documented. 
We have so far used two different tasks in our laboratory studies of 
cumulative cultural evolution (Caldwell & Millen 2008). In one of our tasks, 
participants are asked to build a paper aeroplane, the goal being to build one that 
will fly as far as possible. In the other task, participants are asked to build a tower 
out of spaghetti and modelling clay. The goal for this task is to build a tower that 
is as high as possible. Hence we have our objective measures of the success of 
each participant, in relation to the goals they have been given. Furthermore, the 
tasks we have selected show similarities with certain examples of early human 
material culture, such as projectile point shaping, and shelter construction. From 
our point of view, this is also helpful given the types of questions we would like 
to address with these methods (see Section 1 above). The tasks therefore have 
much in common, but there are also important differences between them. Firstly, 
whilst many people have some prior experience of having built a paper aeroplane, 
the spaghetti tower task is far more novel and participants have few preconceived 
ideas about how to approach the task. Secondly, whilst feedback on performance 
on the spaghetti tower task is continual during construction (participants can of 
course see exactly how high their tower currently is), feedback on performance on 
the paper aeroplane task is delayed until construction is complete. 
 
4.2. The design 
We used a replacement method, with each chain totalling ten individuals. 
For each task, we ran ten replicates of these chains of ten participants. Figure 1 
shows a schematic of the replacement design, indicating which participants were 
present in the test group at what point during each trial. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the positions 1 to 10 in each chain. In order to simulate 
generational succession, the participants’ start times were staggered, such that 
every two and a half minutes a new person entered the group. While they were in 
the test group, each participant had five minutes of observation time, during 
which they could watch the previous participants building their artefact, followed 
by five minutes of building time, during which they had to construct their own 
artefact. Once their time was up, they left the test group. The staggered start and 
finish times had the effect that, at any given time (except at the very start and very 
end of any given chain) there were four individuals together in the group, two of 
whom were observing, and two of whom were actually engaged in the task (see 
Figure 1). So, for example, a chain would begin with participant 1 building their 
artefact, with participants 2 and 3 observing. Then, two and a half minutes in, 
participant 2 would also start building, and participant 4 would join the group as 
an observer. The aim was to simulate a miniaturised society, in which one 
generation would have the opportunity to interact with and observe individuals 
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from the previous two generations, but not those further back. However, we did 
retain all artefacts for inspection by later participants, to reflect the more 
permanent record generated by material culture. The experimenter wrote down 
the relevant measurements next to each, so that this information was also 
available. Participants left the testing area once their artefact had been evaluated. 
 
 
 
 
4.3. The ratchet effect  
Our results showed clear evidence for improvement in performance over 
the course of the chains (Caldwell & Millen 2008). Figure 2 shows these results 
for both the paper aeroplanes and the spaghetti towers. The leftmost graphs show 
the results for each of the ten chains separately, so each differently coloured line 
represents a different chain. As is clear from these figures, performance overall 
can be extremely variable. However, when we (Caldwell & Millen 2008) 
analysed the trends over generations we found a strong effect of improvement in 
terms of the goal measures (of plane flight distance and tower height). The 
rightmost graphs displayed in Figure 2 show the average score for the participants 
in each position in the chain, and illustrate the steady improvement much more 
clearly. Thus, skills and knowledge do indeed appear to accumulate in the chains, 
independent of individual membership, consistent with predictions assuming 
cumulative cultural evolution. Furthermore, similar patterns were found for both 
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of the tasks, in spite of the differences between them, suggesting that we are 
tapping in to a fairly general phenomenon. 
 
 
 
 
4.4. Accumulation of modifications 
As well as looking for improvement in performance over generations, we 
were also interested in investigating the inheritance of modifications. We 
predicted that designs would be more similar within chains than they were across 
chains (indicating cultural variation), and also that designs that were close 
together in the chain would be more similar to one another than those that were 
far apart (indicating descent with modification). For this reason we took 
photographs of all of the artefacts that had been created by participants, and we 
were able to use these to test predictions regarding the similarity of designs. The 
photographs were rated by naïve coders, each of whom was given one of the 
photographs from the set and asked to rate it in comparison to all of the others. 
The coders were provided with a seven point scale, which they were to refer to in 
making their ratings. For full details of the methods used to obtain and analyse 
these ratings, see Caldwell and Millen (2008). As predicted, artefacts from the 
same chain were rated as more similar than those from different chains, for both 
the paper aeroplanes and the spaghetti towers. Designs from positions close 
together in the chains were also more similar than those from positions far apart in 
chains, demonstrating that the improvement in performance was associated with 
the accumulation of modifications.  
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5. Applications of these methods 
 
We see great potential for using these methods in order to test hypotheses 
about cumulative cultural evolution. In this section we discuss how some of our 
work to date has helped to address some of the issues raised in the introduction. 
We start by discussing our findings regarding cultural convergence, and explain 
the implications for the potential role of cumulative cultural evolution in human 
behavioural universals. We also discuss experiments explicitly designed to test 
hypotheses about learning mechanisms involved in cumulative cultural evolution. 
This work has obvious implications for the debate surrounding the cognitive 
precursors of cumulative cultural evolution, but is also relevant to the debate 
regarding the uniqueness (or otherwise) of this phenomenon to humans. 
 
5.1. Convergence in cumulative cultural evolution 
As mentioned in Section 1, questions about the possible role of cumulative 
cultural evolution in complex human behavioural universals essentially centre on 
the issue of whether separate cultures are likely to independently invent and retain 
similar behaviours. We have already been able to investigate this issue, based on 
the same dataset already discussed (Caldwell & Millen 2008).  
In biological evolution, convergent evolution refers to a process by which 
species which are only distantly related independently evolve analogous 
adaptations in response to similar environmental pressures. Convergent cultural 
evolution therefore refers to situations in which different populations 
independently develop similar socially transmitted behaviours despite different 
ancestral histories (Caldwell in press). In evolutionary biology, distinctions are 
therefore also drawn between traits which are homologous and those which are 
analogous. Homology refers to the “relationship of two characters that have 
descended, usually with divergence, from a common ancestral character” (Fitch 
2000, p227). In contrast analogy “is distinguished from homology in that its 
characters, although similar, have descended convergently from unrelated 
ancestral characters.” (Fitch 2000, p227). 
Likewise, it is an important question when studying cross-cultural 
similarities, whether those similarities are the result of common cultural descent, 
or convergence from contrasting ancestral forms. In our experiments it is possible 
to study the extent to which convergence occurs, since we can control the contact 
that different microcultures have with one another. As noted in the previous 
section, we had all of our photographs of participants’ planes and towers rated for 
their similarity to one another. As well as using these ratings to look into the 
accumulation of modifications, we were also able to use the ratings to test for 
convergent cultural evolution (i.e. increasing similarity between the different 
chains, over generations). This would be predicted because successful designs are 
liable to have features in common, so the later designs ought to be rated as more 
similar to one another, compared with earlier designs, due to the fact that they 
have in effect been shaped by similar selection pressures. In order to analyse this, 
we took the similarity ratings for all pairs of photographs which were in the same 
position across chains. Positive correlations were found between the position in 
Caldwell, C. A. & Millen, A. E. (2008). Studying cumulative cultural evolution in the laboratory. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B, 363, 3529–3539 (doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0133). 
the chain and the mean similarity ratings, for both tasks. These results are 
displayed in Figure 3. 
 
 
We are by no means the first to show that “iterated learning”, i.e. each 
generation learning from data generated by the previous one, can result in 
convergence across different microsocieties. Kalish et al. (2007), for example, 
have illustrated well that learners’ biases interfere with transmitted information in 
consistent ways, resulting in different chains of learners – who have often been 
provided with quite different information to start with – passing on very similar 
data (see also Griffiths et al this volume). However such findings, albeit 
fascinating, may not contribute greatly to the question of whether cumulative 
cultural evolution could present an alternative account of the existence of 
complex human behaviours. As noted in Section 1, Tomasello (1999) has argued 
that cumulative cultural evolution could explain why human behaviour is so 
different from that of the other great apes. In effect the suggestion is that these 
behaviours are the result of the accrued learning of many generations, rather than 
the result of natural selection. The finding that cultural transmission degrades 
information in the general direction of learners’ innate biases therefore does not 
add much to this particular issue. 
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In contrast, our results show that increasing cultural similarity can go 
hand-in-hand with increasing adaptive complexity. Although universality in 
complex human behaviour is often attributed to specialised innate predispositions, 
our results imply that similar behaviours may well be independently discovered 
and passed on within different populations. It is in fact examples such as ours, 
which show cumulative cultural evolution being shaped by feedback from 
multiple attempts, which serve to emphasise just what is so useful about 
cumulative cultural evolution (e.g. Henrich & McElreath 2003). It is a means by 
which information is gained, and then retained, within populations. The extended 
learning period afforded allows us to make discoveries which would not have 
been possible within a single lifetime. Whilst our experiments are so simple, 
small-scale and short-term, as to somewhat trivialise this point, our findings are 
nonetheless illustrative of phenomena that we believe to be operating over much 
longer timescales, in many realms of behaviour. 
 
5.2. Learning mechanisms 
In our ongoing work, we are using the methods that we have developed to 
test hypotheses about the learning mechanisms that may be involved in 
cumulative cultural evolution. It has been proposed that cumulative cultural 
evolution may depend on a capacity for imitation, and that this may be the reason 
for its apparent rarity in nonhumans. Consequently we have run experiments 
(Caldwell & Millen unpublished data) designed to test whether restricting 
opportunities for imitation, and indeed other forms of social learning, influences 
the trends that we find towards improvement over generations of learners.  
Using our paper aeroplane task detailed previously, we have run a variety 
of different experimental conditions, in which certain sources of social 
information are either available or unavailable. Whilst in our previous experiment 
(Caldwell & Millen 2008) participants could observe the two previous 
participants in the chain, and discuss the task with them, as well as see the results 
of their efforts in the form of the completed plane and information about its flight 
distance, in this study we separated these sources of information. In a series of 
different experimental conditions, participants had access to information in the 
form of either: actions only; results only; teaching only; actions plus results; 
actions plus teaching; results plus teaching; or actions, results and teaching. If 
imitation (in terms of “learning to do an act by seeing it done”, e.g. Whiten & 
Ham 1992) is indeed crucial to cumulative cultural evolution, then conditions in 
which this not possible (i.e. those with no information from actions) ought to 
show much weaker trends towards improvement over generations.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In summing up, we believe that the experimental methods that we have 
developed will prove to be extremely useful tools in helping to understand the 
phenomenon of cumulative cultural evolution, and that it will be possible to make 
important contributions to some of the debates which surround this field. We hope 
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that our current findings help to illustrate how scaled-down laboratory tests can be 
used to investigate fundamental cultural processes.  
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